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the source of her actions in a certain way” (p. 12); and third, to develop an 
argument “that agents have free will only if they are the sources of their 
choices in a certain way, and being the source of one’s actions in this way 
requires the falsity of causal determinism” (p. 16). Despite the worries out-
lined above, I think it is clear that Timpe fulfills all three of his goals, and 
that’s an impressive accomplishment for a mere 121 pages of text. I com-
mend his book to you.
The Recalcitrant Imago Dei: Human Persons and the Failure of Naturalism, by 
J. P. Moreland. London: SCM Press, 2009. Pp. xiii + 180. ₤40.00 (paper).
C. STEPHEN LAYMAN, Seattle Pacific University
J. P. Moreland’s The Recalcitrant Imago Dei (hereafter, Imago Dei) is a sus-
tained critique of naturalistic views of the human person. Moreland ar-
gues that naturalism fails to explain (or provides inferior explanations for) 
consciousness, free will, rationality, the self, and moral value; theism of-
fers a better explanation in every case. Given the number and complexity 
of the arguments in Imago Dei, the summary which follows is inevitably 
highly selective.
Why does naturalism provide an inferior explanation of consciousness? First, 
those naturalists who deny property dualism run up against strong argu-
ments, since mental states plausibly have a number of features that physi-
cal states lack, including: (1) being directed toward an object, (2) being pri-
vate, (3) being non-spatial (i.e., neither extended in nor located in space), 
and (4) having a felt-quality (e.g., what it feels like to be in pain). Second, 
those naturalists who accept property dualism have difficulty providing 
adequate explanations of mental states for such reasons as:
1. The “regular correlation between types of mental states and physi-
cal states seems radically contingent” (p. 25). Why is pain (rather 
than a feeling of joy) correlated with C-fiber firing? And how can 
naturalists explain the apparent possibility of “zombie” worlds and 
of “inverted qualia” worlds?
2. Given that naturalists accept the causal closure of the physical do-
main, and given the irreducibility of mental states, naturalists must 
accept epiphenomenalism; but epiphenomenalism is surely false 
since mental causation seems undeniable.
3. Evolutionary explanations of the mental don’t work because “the 
functions organisms carry out consciously could just as well have been 
done unconsciously.” And “it is the output [bodily movement], not 
what caused it, that bears on the struggle for reproductive advan-
tage” (p. 26).
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Theism provides better explanations in each case. For example, the con-
nections between the physical and the mental are contingent because they 
are due to free choices God makes, as Creator. (By contrast, according to 
many naturalists, if two worlds are physical duplicates, then they must 
also be psychological duplicates.) Furthermore, unlike naturalists, tra-
ditional theists reject the causal closure of the physical domain. Finally, 
theists are free to supplement evolutionary explanations with appeals to 
divine purpose.
Why does naturalism provide an inferior explanation of free will? In a nut-
shell, because the libertarian view of free will is far more plausible than 
the compatibilist view and because naturalism comports poorly with lib-
ertarianism. Here Moreland quotes well known naturalists (such as John 
Searle) who grant the intuitive plausibility of the libertarian view, while 
admitting that naturalism excludes it. Moreland offers several reasons 
for thinking that free actions are “virtually impossible to reconcile with 
the naturalist standpoint” (p. 44), among them: (A) Free action requires 
a categorical ability to do otherwise—a mere conditional ability (i.e., one 
would refrain from the act if one wanted or intended to) is not enough. 
For naturalists, however, particular events are subsumed under laws of 
nature, and so “the physical conditions are sufficient to determine or fix 
the chances of the next event” (p. 48). And there seems to be no room for 
a categorical power to do otherwise in this law-governed scheme. (B) Lib-
ertarian free will involves (irreducibly) mental causation. And Moreland 
employs Kim’s exclusion argument to show that naturalism apparently 
rules out causation by (irreducibly) mental factors. (Roughly, every physi-
cal event—and hence every brain event—has a physical cause. But brain 
events do not have two causes, i.e., an irreducibly mental cause in addi-
tion to a physical cause.)
Why does naturalism provide an inferior explanation of rationality? (A) As 
noted above, naturalists falter in explaining free will, and there “are sev-
eral aspects to human reasoning that require free will” (p. 73). “Acts of 
deliberation presuppose that there is more than one possible conclusion 
one could reach, but if determinism is true, there is only one outcome 
possible” (p. 74). Moreover, our logical conclusions are ones we ought 
to draw and ought implies can (p. 74). (B) Naturalists have difficulty ac-
counting for a priori knowledge and for knowledge via introspection. 
For example, naturalism is unable to account for a suitable relation be-
tween the epistemic subject and the abstract objects of a priori knowledge, 
which are causally inert (p. 78). Also, introspection requires a relation-
ship between the mental state and the introspecting subject which natu-
ralism has difficulty explaining: Assuming the relationship is causal, it 
seems to be mental-physical or mental-mental, and naturalism falters in 
explaining such relations. (C) “Rational deliberation exhibits irreducible 
teleology” (p. 83) since a conclusion is the end for the sake of which one 
reasons. But how can teleological explanations of deliberation be rec-
onciled with a scheme in which efficient, event-event causation is the 
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underlying reality? (D) Most if not all mental states are intentional, i.e., 
of or about something (e.g., a thought about triangles). Naturalists often 
try to reduce intentionality to causal relations of input and output, but 
Searle’s famous Chinese Room argument shows that such attempts fail 
(p. 93). (E) Assuming that brain-events are governed by laws of nature, 
“there is no room for the presence of one thought (e.g., if P then Q and P) 
to be responsible for the occurrence of a later thought (e.g., Q), given the 
dependence of the mental on the physical and the causal closure of the 
physical” (p. 95).
Why does naturalism provide an inferior explanation of the self? (A) Our 
direct awareness of ourselves indicates that “body switch cases are per-
fectly possible” (p. 111) and so is disembodied survival. Physicalist views 
of mind appear unable to account for such possibilities. (B) Even if we set 
aside the possibility of disembodied existence, it remains possible that I 
exist but my body does not. For example, the following scenario is meta-
physically possible:
I continue to read the paper throughout a process during which each mac-
ropart of my body is replaced by others in a microsecond and the original 
parts are annihilated. If the process occurs rapidly, my body will not con-
tinue to exist but I do since I continue to read the paper (p. 116).
So, possibly I exist when my body does not, and hence I am not identical 
to my body.
(C) Moreland is in sympathy with an argument advanced by Stewart 
Goetz: While every physical body is essentially a complex entity (i.e., one 
having separable parts), I am essentially a simple entity (i.e., one having 
no separable parts). So, I am not identical with my (or any) physical body 
(p. 118). Moreland grants that this argument leaves open the possibility 
that a person “is identical with a proper part of his body that is an atomic 
simple” (p. 118), but ultimately concludes that this possibility is not very 
plausible.
Why does naturalism provide an inferior explanation of moral value? Of 
course, many naturalists deny that there are objective moral values. But 
even naturalists who accept “a sort of moral Platonism such that various 
value properties are universals and, as such, simply part of the furniture of 
the world, [have] . . . no explanation whatever as to why these properties 
were ever exemplified” (p. 147). For example, how is it that evolutionary 
mechanisms have produced animals that have a high, intrinsic, and equal 
value? To claim that such “intrinsic value properties supervene upon hu-
man biology is just an assertion that names the problem to be solved, it is 
not a solution” (p. 148).
As regards the content of morality, it “would seem that naturalism most 
naturally implies a consequentialist evolutionary ethical understanding 
of moral action; specifically, a view of moral action as a means to repro-
ductive success” (p. 151). But this understanding of morality is highly 
problematic. For one thing, it would seem to be open to the “publicity 
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objection,” i.e., ironically, teaching it “would not promote reproductive 
advantage” (p. 152).
Naturalism gives an inadequate response to the question, “Why be 
moral?” Ultimately, the best answer the naturalist can give is egoistic: one 
should be moral “just in case it is in one’s best interests to be so” (p. 156). 
Theists have a better answer: One should be moral “because the moral law 
is true and is constituted by the non-arbitrary commands of a good, just, 
wise, loving God, or because the moral law is grounded in the way we 
were designed by such a God to function properly” (p. 156).
Finally, evolutionary naturalism apparently removes any ground for 
believing that humans have a high, intrinsic, and equal value, for, from 
this perspective, there is no sharp distinction between humans and other 
animals, and whatever grounds human dignity (e.g., intelligence) appar-
ently comes in degrees, thus undermining equality.
Imago Dei is a bold philosophical exploration of the theological claim 
that humans are created in the image of God. It is impressive in its range 
and in its synthesis of philosophical difficulties for naturalism. I am, how-
ever, inclined to think that the author overestimates the force of his argu-
ments on a few points. Let me offer two illustrations. First, consider the 
claim that naturalists cannot explain why certain brain states (e.g., C-fiber 
firings) are correlated with certain mental states (pains). Assuming this is 
so, what explanation can theists offer? The appeal to free divine creative 
activity would explain the contingency of such correlations (assuming 
they are contingent), but it does not tell us why God chose to link C-fiber 
firings with pains, rather than, say, with the taste of chocolate. So, it’s not 
clear to me that such correlations are something theists can explain better 
than naturalists can.
Second, are the proffered theistic answers to “Why be moral?” clear-
ly superior to possible naturalistic answers? For example, consider the 
claim that one should be moral because “the moral law is true and is 
constituted by the non-arbitrary commands of a good, just, wise, loving 
God” (p. 156). Why couldn’t a naturalist, with about equal plausibility, 
claim that one should be moral simply because the moral law is true? 
Of course, many naturalists would not give this answer, because they 
deny that there is any objective moral truth. But many naturalists af-
firm that there is objective moral truth, and they could give this answer. 
(Moreland does raise important questions about naturalistic attempts to 
explain the presence of objective moral truth, but I take it that the “Why 
be moral?” issue is supposed to be a problem independently of the ques-
tion of moral truth.)
In conclusion, Imago Dei makes a helpful contribution to the dialogue 
between theism and naturalism by providing a comprehensive theory 
of the human person that highlights difficulties for naturalism. While 
Imago Dei may not always be convincing, it takes the reader on a very 
thought-provoking excursion through complex territory in the philoso-
phy of mind. 
